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	 1. What	recent	developments	suggest	the	rise	of	cities	in	international	affairs?		2. What	have	cities	been	doing	to	govern	climate	change	and	which	of	these	governance	activities	generate	normative	effects	transnationally?		 3. How	do	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	generated	by	cities	and	transmitted	by	their	networks	lead	to	cities	reducing	their	GHG	emissions	and	increasing	their	climate	resilience?			 4. How	do	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	generated	by	cities	and	transmitted	by	their	networks	relate	to	those	of	the	UNFCCC	regime?			 5. Do	cities	make	a	positive	normative	contribution	to	the	global	constellation	of	climate	change	governance	activities?			These	questions	are	complemented	by	sub-questions	in	each	chapter.		
	
3.	Methodology				 	 In	the	first	phase	of	research	for	this	thesis,	I	mapped	out	the	development	of	the	UNFCCC	regime	and	the	wider	climate	change	regime	complex	in	order	to	identify	and	situate	the	emergence	of	a	focus	on	cities	in	the	climate	change	discourse	amongst	policy-makers,	practitioners,	and	researchers.84	In	carrying	out	this	mapping	exercise,	I	relied	on	(1)	reports	and	studies	published	by	international	organizations	including	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	(OECD),	World	Bank	and	UNFCCC,	(2)	secondary	literature	including	academic	journal	articles	and	treatises,	and	(3)	literature	published	by	ICLEI.	As	mentioned	earlier,	ICLEI	has	been	a	leading	advocate	for	greater	recognition	of	the	role	of	local	and	subnational	governments	at	the	UNFCCC.			 	 		 		 	 In	the	second	phase	of	research,	I	conducted	an	extensive	desktop	review	of	the	literature	to	identify	the	reasons	for	the	emergence	of	cities	as	actors	in	transnational	climate	governance	and,	more	broadly,	in	international	affairs.	The	literature	review	included	academic	journal	articles,	monographs,	leading	newspapers	and	magazines	such	as	The	Financial	Times,	The	Guardian,	Economist	and	Foreign	Policy.	I	carefully	studied	the	working	papers	of	research	institutes	and	policy	think	tanks	as	a	source	of	emerging	trends	and	new	thinking	about	cities	and	global	affairs.	Another	source	of	materials	for	my	desktop	review	was	the	research	publications	of	international	organizations	such	as	the	World	Bank,	United	Nations	Environment	Programme	and	the	OECD.	Finally,	I	scrutinized	the	press	releases	and	other	publicly	available	materials	that	cities	and	city	networks	have	produced	in	order	to	evaluate	how	cities	and	their	networks	use	certain	language	to	construct	their	identities	as	responsible	global	actors	who	are	important	partners	in	the	global																																																									84	Regime	complex	theory	will	be	explained	in	Chapter	2.		
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effort	to	address	climate	change.	For	example,	C40’s	website	states	that	cities	are	on	a	mission	because	of	the	belief	that	“the	battle	to	prevent	catastrophic	climate	change	will	be	won	or	lost	in	our	cities”.85	At	the	end	of	this	phase,	based	on	insights	I	derived	from	the	literature	and	empirical	data,	I	developed	a	theoretical	account	of	the	emergence	of	cities	as	actors	in	international	affairs.		 	 	 		 In	the	third	phase	of	the	research,	I	focused	on	identifying	global	cities	that	are	widely	recognized	as	proactive	frontrunners	in	transnational	climate	change	governance.	The	aim	was	to	include	a	chapter	in	this	thesis	on	what	global	cities	are	doing	locally	to	address	climate	change	so	as	to	ground	the	discussion	in	this	thesis	in	everyday	reality,	and	to	shed	light	on	the	connections	between	the	local	and	the	global	levels	of	governance.	I	identified	these	cities	based	on	a	review	of	the	literature,	and	publicly	available	data	on	carbon	Climate	Registry	which	enables	subnational	governments	to	publicly	report	their	climate	actions	on	a	regular	basis.	Case	studies	published	by	C40,	ICLEI	and	regional	city	networks	such	as	Cities	
Development	Initiative	for	Asia	also	constituted	a	useful	source	of	information	for	identifying	climate	frontrunners.86	The	choice	of	global	cities	that	are	featured	in	Chapter	4	was	also	dictated	by	the	availability	of	information	in	the	English	language	and	some	degree	of	familiarity	with	the	broader	social	and	legal	contexts	in	which	these	cities	functioned.	I	also	conducted	semi-structured	interviews	with	city	government	officials,	consultants	with	extensive	experience	working	with	cities	on	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	strategies,	current	and	former	staff	at	C40	and	ICLEI	to	better	understand	how	these	global	cities	were	addressing	climate	change.	These	interviews	were	semi-structured	in	nature	so	as	to	allow	for	flexibility.	Each	interview	began	with	several	tailored	questions	to	understand	the	specific	perspective	and	expertise	of	the	interviewee.	The	interviews	were	primarily	conducted	by	video	calls,	while	some	were	conducted	face-to-face.	Before	each	interview	commenced,	interviewees	were	informed	that	their	responses	would	be	included	in	this	thesis	and	their	personal	anonymity	will	be	protected.	A	transcript	would	be	produced	after	each	interview,	and	I	would	seek	clarification	of	any	issues	by	email	correspondence.	A	list	of	the	interviews	is	included	at	the	end	of	this	thesis.		 	 The	fourth	phase	of	the	research	was	focused	on	the	networks	created	by	cities	to	diffuse	best	practices,	norms	and	information.	I	carried	out	an	extensive	desktop	literature	review	to	identify	the	most	active	and	prominent	networks	that	operated	transnationally	and	to	analyze	how	these	networks	served	as	mechanisms	for	the	dissemination	of	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	amongst	global	cities	and	their	governments.	I	carried	out	semi-structured	interviews	with	current	and	former	staff	of	C40	and	ICLEI,	as	well	as	employees	of	various	entities	that	work	in	partnership	with	C40	and	ICLEI	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	the	differences	between	the	networks	and	C40’s	modus	operandi.	 	 	 	 		 	 	 In	the	fifth	stage	of	the	research,	I	focused	on	uncovering	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	global	cities	were	developing	and	implementing	through	their	networks.	I	carried	out	a	desktop	review	of	materials	available	on	the	Internet,	and	secondary	literature	in	the	form	of	academic	research																																																									85	C40,	online:	http://www.c40.org	(accessed	on	12	December	2016).		86	Cities	Development	Initiative	for	Asia,	online:	http://cdia.asia	(accessed	on	2	July	2016).		
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	 Cities	face	many	global	risks	such	as	infectious	diseases	and	terrorism.95	This	section	focuses	on	counterterrorism	efforts	because	it	is	in	this	area	that	cities	have	developed	sophisticated	responses.	According	to	Hank	Savitch,	nearly	three-quarters	of	incidents	labeled	as	a	terror	attack	worldwide,	and	four	out	of	every	five	of	its	subsequent	casualties,	occur	in	cities.96	Savitch	argues	that	the	complexity	of	the	urban	landscape	makes	it	ideal	for	hiding	terrorist	plots.97	Densely	populated	cities	also	facilitate	extensive	loss	of	lives	and	damage	to	property,	generating	strong	symbolic	meaning,	fear	and	anxiety.	Counter-insurgency	expert	David	Kilcullen	believes	that	cities	are	the	target:	“The	goal	is	to	shut	[cities]	down	for	as	long	as	possible,	separate	people	from	one	another,	break	down	communities,	and	push	them	into	mental	fortresses”.98	The	breakdown	of	trust	in	communities	facilitates	further	exploitation.		 	 	 	 	 	 		 While	terrorism	has	traditionally	been	perceived	to	be	a	matter	of	national	security,	increasingly,	global	cities	are	acting	autonomously	as	they	develop	and	institutionalize	their	own	local	and	transnational	counterterrorism	strategies.99	New	York	City,	the	city	that	was	at	the	heart	of	the	September	11	attacks,	offers	a	prime	example	of	how	a	global	city	has	forged	ahead	with	internationalizing	its	municipal	policing	strategy	and	forming	transnational	partnerships	based	on	the	belief	that	cities	“must	serve	as	the	frontline	of	homeland	security”	and	cannot	rely	on	the	federal	government	to	provide	adequate	protection.100	 	 	 		 The	New	York	City	Police	Department	(NYPD)	is	the	largest	municipal	police	
																																																								95	On	the	risks	of	epidemics	and	infectious	diseases	that	a	global	city	faces,	see	Lance	Saker	and	others,	Globalization	and	infectious	diseases:	A	review	of	the	linkages	(UNDP/World	Bank/WHO	Special	Programme	for	Research	and	Training	in	Tropical	Diseases,	2004);	Harris	Ali	and	Roger	Keil,	‘Global	Cities	and	the	Spread	of	Infectious	Disease:	The	Case	of	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome	(SARS)	in	Toronto,	Canada’	(2006)	43	Urban	Studies	491;	Roger	Keil	and	Harris	Ali,	‘Governing	the	Sick	City:	Urban	Governance	in	the	Age	of	Emerging	Infectious	Disease’	(2007)	39	Antipode	846.		96	Hank	V.	Savitch,	Cities	in	a	Time	of	Terror:	Space,	Territory,	and	Local	Resilience	(Routledge	2008),	pgs.	3-7.		97	Ibid.	98	Robert	Muggah,	‘Is	urban	terrorism	the	new	normal?	Probably’	World	Economic	Forum,	Davos	2016	(17	January	2016),	online:	https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/is-urban-terrorism-is-the-new-normal-probably/	(accessed	on	5	May	2016).		99	Kristin	Ljungkvist,	Global	City	2.0:	From	Strategic	Site	to	Global	Actor	(Routledge	2016),	pgs.	77-78.	A	few	hours	after	the	events	of	September	11,	New	York	City	Mayor	Rudolph	Giuliani	and	New	York	Governor	George	Pataki	jointly	gave	a	press	conference.	Mayor	Giuliani	indicated	that	it	was	not	up	to	him	or	the	city	of	New	York	but	to	the	US	President	to	take	charge	of	the	situation	and	respond.	As	Ljungkvist	notes,	this	is	not	surprising	because,	up	till	then,	counterterrorism	was	deemed	to	be	a	federal	concern.	This	perception	would	eventually	shift,	as	will	be	noted	later	in	this	chapter.		100	For	an	articulation	of	this	view,	see	for	example,	Eben	Kaplan,	‘New	York	Spurs	Counterterrorism	Efforts’	Council	on	Foreign	Relations	(28	December	2006	),	online:		http://www.cfr.org/world/new-york-spurs-counterterrorism-efforts/p12312;	the	mission	statement	of	the	New	York	Police	Department	Counterterrorism	Units	state	“Built	upon	the	realization	that	the	City	could	not	rely	solely	on	the	federal	government	for	its	defense,	the	Counterterrorism	Bureau	was	created.”,	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/counterterrorism_units.shtml		(both	websites	accessed	on	3	May	2016).		
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department	in	the	US.101	With	about	36,000	officers	and	15,000	support	staff,	the	department	is	twice	the	size	of	the	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation	(FBI),	which	is	the	federal	counter-terrorism	agency.102	Prior	to	the	September	11	attacks,	the	NYPD	focused	almost	solely	on	crime	reduction	but	after	the	attacks,	the	department	was	fundamentally	reorganized	and	counterterrorism	was	made	one	of	the	NYPD’s	key	priorities.103	An	entirely	new	Counterterrorism	Bureau	was	created	in	2002,	and	the	existing	intelligence	division	was	revamped.	The	Counterterrorism	Bureau	employs	250	full-time	officers,	of	which	about	half	of	them	are	part	of	the	New	York	Joint	Terrorism	Task	Force	with	the	FBI	and	other	federal	law	enforcement	agencies.104	These	officers	have	security	clearance	that	gives	them	access	to	national	and	international	sources	of	intelligence	and	to	investigations	conducted	overseas.105	Through	the	New	York	Joint	Terrorism	Task	Force,	NYPD	officers	have	been	able	to	interrogate	terrorist	suspects	in	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan	and	to	conduct	interviews	at	Guantanamo	Bay.106	The	Counterterrorism	Bureau	provides	some	level	of	counterterrorism	training	for	all	NYPD	officers	such	as	recognizing	suspicious	behavior	and	the	use	of	gear	that	protects	against	biological,	chemical	and	radioactive	weapons.107	The	Counterterrorism	Bureau	is	most	visible	when	it	carries	out	massive	deployment	of	heavily	armed,	paramilitary-style	units	at	high	profile	locations	around	the	city.	According	to	Nussbaum,	NYPD	leaders	stress	that	these	deployments	are	not	random	but	driven	by	intelligence	and	have	proven	to	be	effective.108		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 In	addition	to	the	establishment	of	the	Counterterrorism	Bureau,	under	the	leadership	of	Mayor	Bloomberg	and	Police	Commissioner	Ray	Kelly,	significant	resources	and	expertise	were	put	into	revamping	the	NYPD’s	intelligence	division	into	one	“that	rivals	the	security	services	of	many	small	countries...”109	The	division	is	staffed	by	approximately	eight	hundred	people.	About	half	of	the	division	focuses	specifically	on	terrorism,	while	the	other	half	focuses	on	criminal	activity	such	as	drug	trafficking	and	gang	violence.110	The	division	has	an	International	Liaison	Programme	whereby	NYPD	detectives	are	sent	to	live	in	Europe,	the	Middle	East	and	Southeast	Asia	where	they	serve	as	the	NYPD’s	liaison	to	that	country’s	law	enforcement	and	intelligence	community.111	These	officers	are	not	armed	and	do	
																																																								101	Office	of	Justice	Programs,	Bureau	of	Justice	Statistics,	latest	data	available:	2008;	see	Brian	Reaves,	Census	of	State	and	Local	Law	Enforcement	Agencies,	2008	(US	Department	of	Justice,	July	2011),	pg.	4,	online:	http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=249	(accessed	on	3	May	2016).	102	Brian	Nussbaum,	‘Protecting	Global	Cities:	New	York,	London	and	the	Internationalization	of	Municipal	Policing	for	Counter	Terrorism’	(2007)	8	Global	Crime	213,	pg.	218.		103	Ljungkvist,	pg.	78.	104	Ibid.		105	Ljungkvist,	pg.	75.	106	Ibid.	107	Nussbaum,	pg.	219.	108	Nussbaum,	pg.	220.	109	Ibid.		110	Ljungkvist,	pg.	72.		111	This	programme	is	funded	by	the	New	York	City	Police	Foundation,	a	non-profit	group	that	is	backed	by	private	multinational	corporations	such	as	JP	Morgan,	Goldman	Sachs	and	Barclays;	
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adaptation	but	also	include	mitigation	responsibilities.50	This	is	all	the	more	remarkable	because	Mexico	City,	like	many	major	cities	in	rapidly	emerging	economies,	faces	tremendous	challenges	such	as	high	levels	of	migration	from	rural	areas	into	the	city	as	it	contemplates	a	transition	towards	a	more	climate-friendly	and	sustainable	future.51	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	discussion	below	will	first	set	out	Mexico	City’s	climate	policies	as	well	as	explain	the	main	drivers	behind	the	city’s	ambitions	to	address	climate	change.	These	factors	include	(1)	the	coincidence	of	a	presidency	(for	the	country)	and	a	mayoralty	(for	the	city)	being	held	by	individuals	who	were	committed	to	addressing	environmental	governance	and	climate	change	issues,	(2)	Mexico	City’s	involvement	in	transnational	networks	particularly	C40,	and	(3)	the	availability	of	external	funding	from	international	organizations	like	the	World	Bank	and	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM).	The	section	concludes	with	a	brief	discussion	of	the	Programa	para	Mejorar	la	Calidad	del	Aire	en	el	Valle	de	México	(ProAire)	program	which	has	led	to	impressive	reductions	in	conventional	air	pollution	and	carbon	emissions	in	Mexico	City.		
3.1	Strong	Mayoral	Commitment	to	Tackling	Climate	Change				From	2000	to	2005,	Andrés	Manuel	López	Obrador	served	as	the	mayor	of	Mexico	City.	Described	as	a	visionary,	Mayor	Obrador	“did	not	need	convincing	that	climate	change	was	a	serious	problem	and	one	that	Mexico	City	needed	to	address.”52	Under	Mayor	Obrador’s	leadership,	Mexico	City	produced	its	first	Local	Climate	Action	Strategy	in	2004,	establishing	guidelines	for	local	governmental	agencies,	the	private	sector	and	civil	society	to	promote	mitigation	and	adaptation.53	The	mitigation	measures	focused	on	improving	Mexico	City’s	public	transportation	system,	improving	energy	efficiency,	and	increasing	green	acreage	in	the	city.	To	build	the	city’s	climate	resilience,	the	strategy	identified	that	the	immediate	priority	was	to	increase	public	education	of	risks	such	as	heat	stroke	and	enhancing	early	warning	systems.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 While	Mayor	Obrador	was	responsible	for	placing	climate	change	on	the	city’s	agenda	and	putting	the	institutional	framework	in	place,	it	was	during	Marcelo	Ebrard’s	mayoralty	(2006-2012)	that	Mexico	City	displayed	a	high	level	of	commitment	and	invested	significant	resources	to	developing	and	implementing	an	ambitious	range	of	policies	and	programmes	to	curb	the	city’s	GHG	emissions	and	increase	its	climate	resilience.	Marcelo	Ebrard	was	committed	to	improving	quality																																																									50	Simone	Pulver,	‘A	Climate	Leader?	The	Politics	and	Practice	of	Climate	Governance	in	Mexico	’	in	David	Held,	Charles	Roger	and	Eva-	Maria		Nag	(eds),	Climate	Governance	in	the	Developing	World	(Wiley	2013),	pg.	175.	Mexico	is	the	only	developing	country	to	have	enshrined	long-term	GHG	emissions	reduction	targets	in	national	legislation	and,	in	fact,	is	the	second	country	in	the	world	to	do	so	(the	first	being	the	United	Kingdom);	Richard	Black,	‘Inside	Mexico's	climate	revolution’	BBC	
News	(20	April	2012	),	online:	http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-17777327	(accessed	on	4	November	2016).			51	Interview	No.	10.		52	Ibid.		53	Secretaría	del	Medio	Ambiente	del	Gobierno	del	Distrito	Federal,	(Ministry	of	Environment	of	the	Federal	District),	Estrategia	Local	de	Acción	Climática	de	la	Ciudad	de	México,	2004.	
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of	life	for	his	city’s	twenty	million	inhabitants,	and	that	included	reducing	drug-related	violence,	improving	access	to	education,	and	‘greening’	the	city.54	A	crucial	component	of	Mayor	Ebrard’s	‘green	city’	strategy	was	to	realize	the	co-benefits	of	reducing	Mexico	City’s	severe	air	pollution	and	realizing	GHG	emissions	reductions	at	the	same	time.55	As	transportation	and	fossil	fuel-based	energy	production	are	key	sources	of	carbon	emissions	and	conventional	air	pollutants	(such	as	nitrogen	oxide	and	sulphur	dioxide),	a	climate	mitigation	strategy	will	produce	the	co-benefit	of	improved	air	quality.56			 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 There	are	two	key	factors	that	motivated	Mayor	Marcelo	Ebrard	to	undertake	ambitious	climate	action.	The	first	factor	was	Mexico	City’s	participation	in	transnational	climate	networks,	particularly	C40	and	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change.57	C40	first	emerged	in	2005	and	rapidly	built	a	reputation	for	being	an	elite	group	of	leading	global	cities	that	are	strongly	committed	to	tackling	climate	change.58	Mexico	City	was	keen	to	be	part	of	C40	and	to	prove	its	credentials	as	a	progressive	global	city	that	is	pursuing	ambitious	climate	action.	C40’s	membership	criteria	are	widely	known	to	be	demanding	and	the	quest	to	meet	C40’s	membership	requirements	motivated	Mayor	Ebrard’s	administration	to	pursue	an	ambitious	climate	change	agenda.	Once	Mexico	City	officially	became	a	C40	member,	it	can	be	said	that	frequent	interactions	with	other	cities	and	participation	in	the	network	provided	a	healthy	dose	of	peer	pressure	that	added	impetus	to	Mayor	Ebrard’s	climate	change	agenda.59		 	 	 	 	 	 		 Mayor	Ebrard	was	also	active	in	another	transnational	network	known	as	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change.60	The	mayor	of	Kyoto,	Yorikane	Masumoto,	initiated	the	founding	of	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change	soon	after	the	Kyoto	Protocol	entered	into	force	in	February	2005.61	This	network	of	mayors	seeks	to	represent	and	advocate	for	cities	on	matters	pertaining	to	global	sustainability.62	Mayor	Ebrard	was	not	only	an	active	participant;	in	2009,	he	was	elected	to	be	the	chairman	of	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change,	and	Mexico	City	hosted	the	2010	World	Mayors	Summit	on	Climate	Change.63		This	was	a																																																									54	Joel	Jaeger,	‘Reflecting	on	Marcelo	Ebrard's	Tenure	as	the	Mayor	of	Mexico	City’	Council	on	
Hemispheric	Affairs	(Mexico,	20	September	2012)	Front	Page,	online:	http://www.coha.org/reflecting-on-marcelo-ebrards-tenure-as-the-mayor-of-mexico-city/	(accessed	on	4	November	2016).	55	Interview	No.	10.	On	the	co-benefit	approach,	see	Netherlands	Environmental	Assessment	Agency	(PBL),	Co-benefits	of	climate	policy	(PBL	Report	no	500116005,	2009),	online:	http://www.unep.org/transport/gfei/autotool/understanding_the_problem/Netherlands%20Environment%20Agency.pdf	(accessed	on	4	November	2016).	56	Ibid.		57	Interview	No.	10.		58	See	detailed	discussion	of	C40	in	Chapter	5.		59	Ibid.		60	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change,	online:	http://www.worldmayorscouncil.org	(accessed	on	8	November	2016).	61	Ibid.	62	Ibid.	63	Local	Government	Climate	Roadmap,	“World	Mayors	Summit	on	Climate	–	Mayors	push	for	hope	after	Copenhagen”,	online:	http://www.iclei.org/climate-roadmap/advocacy/global-lg-events/2010-world-mayors-summit-on-climate-mexico-city.html	(accessed	on	8	November	2016).		
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occurring	in	the	North	Atlantic	Basin	and	heat	waves	could	triple	in	frequency	due	to	the	city’s	dense	built	environment	and	the	urban	heat	island	effect	that	causes	temperatures	in	NYC	to	be	up	to	seven	degrees	(Fahrenheit)	higher	than	in	surrounding	areas.	According	to	the	NYC	Panel	on	Climate	Change,	there	is	a	ninety	percent	probability	that	NYC	will	experience	more	frequent	heavy	downpours.		 The	discussion	below	sets	out	the	policies	and	measures	that	have	been	implemented	since	NYC’s	then-Mayor	Michael	Bloomberg	decided	to	take	concerted	action	on	climate	change	in	his	second	term	(2005-2013).	PLANYC	is	a	comprehensive	plan	outlining	the	Mayor’s	vision	for	a	more	sustainable	city	and,	for	the	first	time,	set	a	GHG	emissions	reduction	goal	for	NYC.	Since	the	launch	of	PLANYC,	the	city	has	passed	more	than	a	hundred	laws	and	regulations	to	address	climate	change.99	As	has	been	observed	about	the	other	cities	discussed	in	this	chapter,	a	crucial	element	behind	a	city’s	ability	to	undertake	ambitious	climate	action	is	high-level	political	leadership.	NYC	is	no	exception,	with	then-Mayor	Bloomberg	acting	as	“the	champion	of	the	climate	change	issue	for	the	city,	guiding	the	overall	process	with	great	foresight	and	courage.”100		 	 		 Succeeding	Michael	Bloomberg	in	2014,	the	current	mayor	of	NYC	is	Bill	de	Blasio.	Mayor	de	Blasio	campaigned	on	a	platform	focused	on	tackling	NYC’s	growing	income	and	social	inequality.101	Therefore,	his	agenda	so	far,	while	demonstrating	a	very	high	level	of	commitment	to	mitigation	and	building	the	city’s	climate	resilience,	is	built	on	a	broad	understanding	of	social,	environmental	and	economic	sustainability;	tackling	climate	change	has	become	one	of	four	core	issues	instead	of	the	main	focus	of	his	mayoralty	as	it	had	been	for	Michael	Bloomberg.102		
4.1	PLANYC:	A	Sustainability	and	Climate	Change	Blueprint	for	the	“City	that	
Never	Sleeps”		As	early	as	the	mid-1990s,	policy	experts	and	scientists	were	producing	studies	that	warned	of	the	climate	vulnerabilities	that	NYC	faced	and	how	climate	change	would	drive	up	risks	such	as	heat-stress	mortality	and	mosquito-borne	diseases.103	However,	these	warnings	were	ignored	by	the	Giuliani	mayoral	administration	(1994-2001)	which	took	the	position	that	“…that	if	action	was	indeed	necessary,	it	could	be	delayed,	because	climate	change	was	a	long-term	problem.”104		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 When	the	Bloomberg	mayoral	administration	(2002-2013)	took	office,	its																																																									99	New	York	City	Council,	Comprehensive	Platform	to	Combat	Climate	Change	(2014),	online:	http://council.nyc.gov/html/pr/climateagenda.pdf	(accessed	on	11	November	2016).		100	Katherine		Bagley	and	Maria		Gallucci,	‘How	Mayor	Michael	Bloomberg	Thought	Big	on	Climate’	
Scientific	American	(20	December	2013	),	online:	http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/bloomberg-climate-plan-genesis-excerpt/	(accessed	on	11	November	2016).	101	For	discussion,	see	for	example,	George	Packer,	‘Bill	de	Blasio's	Vision’	The	New	Yorker	(12	August	2013).		102	See	discussion	below	about	Mayor	de	Blasio’s	climate	agenda.		103	Cynthia		Rosenzweig	and	William	Solecki,	‘Chapter	1:	New	York	City	adaptation	in	context’	(2010)	1196	Annals	of	the	New	York	Academy	of	Sciences	19,	pg.	20.		104	Bagley	and	Gallucci,	ibid.		
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European	ports.138	Efforts	to	manage	Rotterdam’s	port-related	GHG	emissions	can	therefore	have	a	significant	global	impact,	a	realization	not	lost	on	Rotterdam’s	city	government	who	spearheaded	the	World	Ports	Climate	Initiative.		 	 		 The	following	section	will	first	describe	the	city	of	Rotterdam’s	climate	mitigation	initiatives,	followed	by	an	account	of	the	port	of	Rotterdam’s	climate	mitigation	efforts.	With	regard	to	port-related	efforts	to	address	climate	change,	particular	emphasis	will	be	placed	on	Rotterdam’s	founding	role	in	the	World	Ports	Climate	Initiative,	a	voluntary	effort	undertaken	by	55	of	the	world’s	largest	ports	to	individually	and	jointly	work	together	to	reduce	the	climate	impacts	of	port	operations	and	the	global	shipping	industry.	The	focus	then	shifts	to	Rotterdam’s	innovative	and	ambitious	adaptation	efforts	that	have	earned	it	the	reputation	as	a	leading,	if	not	the	leading,	“climate-proof”	delta	city.		 	 	 		 A	common	thread	that	runs	through	all	of	Rotterdam’s	climate	initiatives	is	the	significant	role	that	C40	participation	played	in	motivating	Rotterdam	to	take	ambitious	climate	change	action	and,	furthermore,	to	take	a	leadership	role	on	the	global	stage	in	the	areas	of	port-related	mitigation	and	building	resilience	in	delta	cities.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	in	2013,	Rotterdam	was	selected	to	participate	in	the	100	Resilient	Cities	program,	pioneered	by	the	Rockefeller	Foundation	to	empower	cities	to	develop	resilience.139	Resilience	is	understood	as	“[t]he	capacity	of	individuals,	communities,	institutions,	businesses,	and	systems	within	a	city	to	survive,	adapt,	and	grow	no	matter	what	kinds	of	chronic	stresses	and	acute	shocks	they	experience.”140	Becoming	a	member	of	this	program	marked	a	turning	point	in	Rotterdam’s	climate	change	strategy.	In	the	process	of	developing	its	resilience	strategy,	the	city	government	began	to	approach	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	as	part	of	a	broader	attempt	to	build	the	city’s	resilience.141	As	set	out	in	its	resilience	strategy,	Rotterdam’s	vision	is	that	in	2030,	the	city	will	be	one	where	“the	energy	infrastructure	provides	for	an	efficient	and	sustainable	energy	supply”	and	“climate	adaptation	has	penetrated	into	mainstream	city	operations.”142	Thinking	in	terms	of	resilience	has	helped	the	city	create	synergistic	links	between	climate	change,	social	inclusion,	health,	and	a	host	of	other	dimensions	that	make	up	the	fabric	of	a	city’s	life.143		
5.1	Urban	climate	mitigation		Compared	to	other	Dutch	cities	like	Amsterdam,	Rotterdam	had	a	late	start	in	addressing	climate	change.144	In	2002,	the	Klimaatcovenant,	a	national	multi-level																																																									138	Ibid.	pg.	61.		139	100	Resilient	Cities,	‘First	Resilient	Cities	Announced	by	Rockefeller	Foundation’,online:		http://www.100resilientcities.org/blog/entry/33-resilient-cities-announced#/-_/(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	140	Gemeente	Rotterdam,	Rotterdam	Climate	Initiative,	and	100	Resilient	Cities,	‘Rotterdam	Resilience	Strategy’,	pg.	18.		141	Interview	Number	11.		142	Rotterdam	Resilience	Strategy,	pg.	24.		143	See	Part	3.2.1	of	Chapter	6	for	more	discussion	about	Rotterdam’s	resilience	strategy.	144	Joyeeta	Gupta,	Ralph	Lasage	and	Tjeerd	Stam,	‘National	Efforts	to	enhance	local	climate	polict	in	the	Netherlands’	(2007)	4	Environmental	Sciences	171,	pg.	174.		
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6.	Seoul,	South	Korea	The	largest	city	and	capital	of	South	Korea,	Seoul	is	home	to	25%	of	the	country’s	population.172	The	city’s	10.4	million	residents	live	within	605	square	kilometres,	making	Seoul	one	of	the	most	densely	populated	cities	in	the	world.173	It	is	also	a	wealthy	city	that	has	prospered	greatly	since	the	1960s	after	the	Korean	War	ended	and	the	country	began	a	process	of	reconstruction.	In	this	regard,	it	should	be	noted	that	in	the	1960s,	“[South	Korea]	was	poorer	than	Bolivia	and	Mozambique;	today,	it	is	richer	than	New	Zealand	and	Spain,	with	a	per	capita	income	of	almost	[US]$23,000”.174	As	such,	amongst	Asian	cities,	Seoul	is	in	the	unique	and	enviable	position	of	having	the	financial	resources	(as	well	as	political	leadership	and	impressive	record	of	technological	innovation)	to	undertake	ambitious	climate	change	action.	To	indicate	the	extent	of	Seoul’s	resources,	the	city’s	administrative	body,	the	Seoul	Metropolitan	Government,	had	an	operating	budget	of	US$18.4	billion	in	2010.175		 	 	 	 	 	 																																																									168	City	of	Rotterdam,	pg.	28.		169	Ibid.,	pg.	29.	Also	see,	‘Can	Rotterdam	become	the	world's	most	sustainable	port	city?’	CNN	(26	August	2013).		170	Connecting	Delta	Cities	newsletter,	“International	delta	conference	in	Rotterdam”,	online:	http://www.deltacities.com/newsletter/international-delta-conference-in-rotterdam?news_id=66	(accessed	on	1	October	2016).		171	Connecting	Delta	Cities,	online:	http://www.deltacities.com/about-c40-and-cdc	(accessed	on	1	October	2016).		172	Seoul	Metropolitan	Government,	“Ranking”,	online:		http://english.seoul.go.kr/gtk/gcs/ranking.php	(accessed	on	20	October	2016).		173	Ibid.		174	Marcus	Noland,	‘Six	Markets	to	Watch:	South	Korea’	[2014]	Foreign	Affairs		175	Seoul	Metropolitan	Government,	“Ranking”,	online:		http://english.seoul.go.kr/gtk/gcs/ranking.php	(accessed	on	20	October	2016).		
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7.	Conclusion	In	this	chapter,	we	learnt	about	the	policies,	strategies	and	programs	that	five	global	cities	-	London,	Mexico	City,	New	York	City,	Rotterdam	and	Seoul	–	have	put	in	place	in	response	to	the	risks	of	climate	change	as	well	as	to	reduce	their	GHG	emissions.	As	much	of	the	chapter	pays	attention	to	local	circumstances	and	efforts,	it	is	easy	to	get	lost	in	the	details	and	lose	sight	of	how	this	chapter	fits	into	the	larger	narrative	of	this	thesis.	Thus,	this	conclusion	will	highlight	a	few	salient	points	that	arise	from	the	preceding	discussion	and	relate	them	to	the	central	analysis	of	the	emergence	of	global	cities	as	governance	actors	who	are	beginning	to	exercising	law-making	functions	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 First,	the	purpose	of	this	chapter	was	to	inform	the	reader	of	the	extent	and	type	of	governance	activities	global	cities	around	the	world	are	engaging	in.	From	the	outset,	Mayor	Livingstone	of	London	recognized	that	cities	ought	to	learn	from	one	another,	inspire	and	support	each	other’s	efforts,	and	in	the	process	of	repeated	interactions,	cultivate	norms	and	practices	concerning	urban	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation.	That	cities	could	play	a	meaningful	role	in	addressing	a	global	environmental	problem	like	climate	change	even	when	states	appeared	incapable	of	taking	concerted	action	is	a	norm	that	began	to	emerge	during	Livingstone’s	mayoralty.	It	soon	became	internalized	by	city	officials	and	other	actors,	and	gained	transnational	traction	especially	as	a	result	of	C40’s	public	relations	campaigns,	as	we	will	see	in	the	next	chapter.	Eventually,	it	has	become	a	norm	within	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	In	this	regard,	the	local	influenced	the	global,	just	as	the	global	agenda	shaped	the	local	one.	 	 	 		 Secondly,	a	factor	that	has	enabled	cities	to	govern	climate	change	is	the	resources	made	available	by	transnational	actors	including	international	organizations,	private	foundations	and	global	environmental	NGOs.	For	example,	Mexico	City’s	Metrobus	System	project,	which	has	significantly	improved	air	quality	and	reduced	GHG	emissions	in	the	city,	enjoyed	the	support	of	World	Resources	Institute	(a	leading	global	environmental	NGO)	and	funding	from	the	World	Bank,	Shell	Foundation	and	Caterpillar	Foundation.197	The	availability	of	financial	support	from	external	parties	will,	of	course,	be	particularly	relevant	for	less	wealthy	cities.	However,	even	for	wealthier	cities	such	as	Rotterdam	in	the	Netherlands,	support	from	transnational	actors	has	also	made	a	difference.	For	example,	Rotterdam	approached	C40	to	initiate	a	program	for	ports	to	address	climate	change	because	it	did	not	want	to	go	at	it	alone	at	the	risk	of	its	port	losing	its	competitive	advantage.	The	city’s	involvement	in	Rockefeller	Foundation’s	100	Resilient	Cities	program	also	significantly	shaped	and	has	had	lasting	influence	on	Rotterdam’s	strategic	approach	and	programs	on	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation.	In	the	case	of	Seoul,	the	city	had	the	financial	resources	but	lacked	the	policy	and	technical	know-how.	Participation	in	a	transnational	network,	the	C40,	helped	it	to	gain	critical	knowledge	and	overcome	its	learning	curve	more	quickly	than	it	would	otherwise																																																									197	See	Footnote	85	of	this	chapter.			
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“NDCs”.152	Countries	are	required	to	update	their	NDCs	every	five	years.153	Each	time,	the	update	needs	to	represent	“a	progression	beyond	the	Party’s	then	current	nationally	determined	contribution.”154	It	also	needs	to	take	into	account	the	five-yearly	“global	stock	take”	exercise	mandated	under	Article	14	of	the	Paris	Agreement	to	assess	“the	collective	progress	towards	achieving	the	purpose	of	this	Agreement	and	its	long-term	goals.”	Maljean-Dubois	describes	the	NDC	process	as	a	reflection	of	self-differentiation,	which	“is	the	result	of	a	fully	bottom-up	(and	voluntary)	process	of	self-determination	of	national	pledges.”155	She	further	argues	that	the	Paris	Agreement	embodies	a	more	dynamic	notion	of	differentiation,	whereby	each	section	takes	a	different	approach	to	differentiation,	“carefully	balancing	what	will	be	differentiated	and	what	will	be	common	in	the	post-	2020	period.”156	For	example,	the	finance	provisions	are	based	on	a	strong	version	of	differentiation.	As	such,	developed	countries	“shall	provide	financial	resources	to	assist	developing	country	Parties.”157	On	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	are	the	provisions	pertaining	to	the	transparency	framework.	Maljean-Dubois	points	out	that	it	is	in	this	part	of	the	Paris	Agreement	that	“the	obligations	of	developed	and	developing	countries	are	converging	the	most”	as	all “Parties shall account for their 
nationally determined contributions”158 even if the transparency framework takes 
into account parties’ different capacities. These	developments	mark	a	significant	departure	from	the	differential	treatment	between	developed	and	developing	countries	contained	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol.		 	 	 	 	 		 As	the	brief	discussion	above	shows,	the	CBDRRC	principle	is	a	normative	pillar	of	the	climate	change	regime.	Its meaning and application has changed 
significantly over time, and some may say that such changes constitute 
refinements that will bode well for the development of a comprehensive 
international framework on climate change. The CBCRRC principle has also been 
taken into account by cities in their norm-setting actions. The	preamble	of	the	Seoul	Declaration	issued	at	the	C40	Large	Cities	Climate	Summit	2009	states	that	C40	cities	share	the	view	that	it	is	necessary	to	take	immediate	actions	“…based	on	the	principles	of	co-existence,	mutual	benefit	and	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities”.159	Accordingly,	“cities	in	developed	countries	need	to	assist	the	efforts	of	cities	in	developing	countries”160	and	leadership	is	expected	from	more	developed	and	wealthier	cities	that	have	the	resources	to,	for	example,	organize	and	host	summits,	conferences	and	workshops.	C40’s	adherence	to	the	CBDRRC																																																									152	Article	14(2)	of	the	Paris	Agreement;	see	ibid.	pg.	11	for	discussion	on	the	NDCs.	153	Article	4(9)	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	154	Article	4(3)	of	the	Paris	Agreement	155	Sandrine	Maljean-Dubois,	‘The	Paris	Agreement:	A	New	Step	in	the	Gradual	Evolution	of	Differential	Treatment	in	the	Climate	Regime?’	(2016)	25	Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	Law	1,	pg.	4.		156	Ibid,	pg.	2.	157	Article	4	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	158	Article	4(13)	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	159	Preamble	of	the	Seoul	Declaration,	adopted	at	the	Third	C40	Large	Cities	Climate	Summit,	Seoul,	South	Korea,	21	May	2009.		160	Ibid.		
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principle	is	de	facto,	not	de	jure,	as	it	is	not	legally	bound	by	the	climate	change	treaties.	By	voluntarily	adopting	this	principle,	and	applying	it	to	its	member	cities,	C40	is	indirectly	expanding	the	authority	of	the	UNFCCC	regime.	It	should	be	noted	that	there	are	C40	cities	located	in	states	that	have	not	ratified	the	Kyoto	Protocol.161	Further,	C40	member	cities	Toronto	and	Vancouver	are	located	in	Canada,	a	state	that	withdrew	from	the	Kyoto	Protocol	during	its	second	commitment	period.162	Therefore,	it	can	be	argued	that	prior	to	the	signing	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	C40’s	application	of	the	CBDRRC	principle	was	a	way	for	UNFCCC	norms	to	circumvent	recalcitrant	or	reluctant	national	governments	and	find	articulation	within	states	at	the	subnational	level.		 	 		 Furthermore,	the	CBDRRC	principle	has	traditionally	been	applied	in	the	context	of	the	multilateral	climate	change	negotiations,	but	it	can	have	wider	application	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	For	example,	Scott	and	Rajamani	have	argued	that	the	fact	that	the	CBDRRC	principle	is	a	“fundamental 
part of the conceptual apparatus of the climate change regime also implies…that 
state parties are obliged not just to interpret current obligations and fashion new 
ones in keeping with the CBDRRC principle, but also to take this principle into 
account in their unilateral actions vis-à-vis other parties.”163 C40’s endorsement of 
the CBDRRC principle similarly indicates the principle’s wider relevance, which 
in the present case constitutes horizontal application	of	the	principle	amongst	sub-state	entities	domestically	and	globally.		
4.3	MRV	and	Transparency				 	 The	architects	of	the	Paris	Agreement	intend	to	use	data	transparency	as	a	driving	force	to	build	trust	and	to	create	incentives	for	parties	to	work	towards	climate	mitigation	based	on	domestically	determined	targets	volunteered	on	a	bottom-up	basis.164	Article	13	of	the	Paris	Agreement	establishes	“an	enhanced	transparency	framework	for	action	and	support.”	This	information-based	mechanism	embodies	the	approach	whereby	GHG	emission	reduction	targets	are	determined	nationally	while	MRV	is	organized	at	the	international	level.	In	order	to	“build	mutual	trust	and	confidence	and	to	promote	effective	implementation”165,	the	transparency	framework	is	intended	to	provide	informational	clarity	and	permit	tracking	of	individual	states’	progress	towards	achieving	their	NDCs.	Each	party	is	required	to	regularly	provide	a	national	inventory	report	of	its	GHG	emissions	and																																																									161	For	example,	the	US.		162	Canada	withdrew	from	the	Kyoto	Protocol	on	15	December	2012;	UNFCCC,	“Status	of	Ratification”,	online:	http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		163	Joanne	Scott	and	Lavanya	Rajamani,	‘EU	Climate	Change	Unilateralism’	(2012)	23	European	Journal	of	International	Law	469,	pg.	477.	164	For	an	overview	of	differing	opinions	on	whether	the	Paris	Agreement	represents	a	step	forward	in	addressing	climate	change	given	that	“country	specific	targets	volunteered	on	a	bottom-up	basis	are	less	likely	to	be	sufficiently	ambitious,	in	the	aggregate,	to	meet	global	goals”,	see	Streck,	Keenlyside	and	von	Unger,	pg.	28.		165	Article	13(1)	of	the	Paris	Agreement.		
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2.1	Coherence	In	Keohane	and	Victor’s	view,	the	coherence	of	a	regime	complex	depends	on	the	extent	to	which	the	various	specific	regimes	are	“compatible	and	mutually	reinforcing.”5	Coherence	is	perceived	to	be	a	good	thing	in	a	utilitarian	sense:	“[w]here	compatibilities	exist	they	encourage	linkages	that	make	it	easier	to	channel	resources	from	one	element	of	the	regime	complex	to	another…”6	I	will	seek	to	furnish	Keohane	and	Victor’s	definition	with	more	detail	before	proceeding	to	evaluate	the	extent	to	which	urban	climate	law	contributes	towards	building	coherence	in	the	regime	complex.		 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	concept	of	coherence	has	received	significant	attention	in	the	literature	on	the	functioning	of	the	EU,	which	seeks	to	live	up	to	its	self-imposed	commitment	to	ensure	the	coherence	of	its	policies.	Interest	in	coherence	predated	the	creation	of	the	EU’s	single	institutional	framework	given	that,	without	the	unifying	framework,	the	political	functioning	of	the	EU	rested	upon	the	legal	obligation	of	coherence.7	Today,	Article	13	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	constitutes	the	legal	basis	for	coherence	in	EU	foreign	policy	and	coherence	has	emerged	as	a	principle	understood	to	impose	a	procedural	obligation	on	EU	foreign	policy	actors	to	coordinate	their	policies.8	From	the	perspectives	of	the	European	Commission	and																																																									5	Keohane	and	Victor,	pg.	16.	6	Ibid.		7	Deidre	Curtin,	‘	The	Constitutional	Structure	of	the	Union:	A	Europe	of	Bits	and	Pieces’	(1993)	30	Common	Market	Law	Review	17,	pg.	27.		8	Clara	Portela	and	Kolja	Raube,	(in-)Coherence	in	EU	Foreign	Policy:	Exploring	Sources	and	Remedies	(Paper	presented	at	the	European	Studies	Association	Bi-annual	Convention,	Los	Angeles,	April	
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indicator	is	the	existence	of	shared	supporting	measures	such	as	capacity	building	and	technology	transfer	mechanisms	amongst	the	regimes.	The	fifth	indicator	is	the	extent	of	learning	among	the	regimes.		 	 	 	 	 		 Applying	the	first	indicator	of	shared	norms	and	principles,	it	can	be	argued	that	urban	climate	law	contributes	to	consistency	and	compatibility	because	the	norms	and	practices	of	cities	are	consistent	with	the	goals	of	other	actors	in	the	regime	complex	–	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	–	and	the	general	adherence	to	the	notions	of	environmental	liberalism.	Further,	cities	acting	through	the	C40	support	the	CBDRRC	principle.	Another	example	is	the	Compact	of	Mayors	initiative,	which	is	intended	to	complement	the	transparency	framework	engendered	by	the	Paris	Agreement.	As	such,	there	is	strong	adherence	by	global	cities	to	a	common	principle	of	transparency	that	forms	a	key	pillar	of	the	post-2020	UNFCCC	regime.	 With	regard	to	the	second	indicator	of	whether	common	economic	incentives	to	promote	the	same	type	of	activities	exist,	it	can	be	argued	that	climate	finance	in	the	UNFCCC	regime	and	other	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	development	aid	agencies	provide	common	economic	incentives	to	pursue	low-carbon	development,	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation.	The	common	economic	incentives	provided	by	climate	finance	are	being	extended	to	the	realm	of	sustainable	urban	development	and	global	cities	are	being	encouraged	to	engage	in	transnational	climate	financing	arrangements	in	their	efforts	to	address	climate	change.	As	discussed	in	earlier	chapters,	the	various	‘orchestration’	efforts	by	the	World	Bank	and	other	actors	include	training	programs	to	build	the	capacity	of	city	governments	to	gain	access	to	sources	of	climate	finance	and	‘matchmaker	workshops’	to	connect	potential	investors	and	city	governments	that	are	seeking	funding	for	climate	projects.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	streamlining	of	reporting	and	monitoring	obligations	creates	further	synergy	between	urban	climate	law,	climate	initiatives	by	private	actors,	and	the	UNFCCC	regime.	The	UNFCCC	has	a	global	platform	known	as	the	Non-State	Actor	








prohibits	the	doing	of	‘bad	things’	lacks	legitimacy	because	it	fails	to	communicate	what	is	expected,	except	within	a	very	small	constituency	in	which	‘bad’	has	achieved	a	high	degree	of	culturally	induced	specificity.	To	be	legitimate,	a	rule	must	communicate	what	conduct	is	permitted	and	what	conduct	is	out	of	bounds.		 														While	Franck	is	concerned	with	the	textual	determinacy	of	rules	found	in	treaties,	resolutions	of	international	organizations	and	so	forth,	nothing	in	his	analysis	precludes	extending	the	discussion	of	rule	determinacy	to	the	realm	of	voluntary	standards.31	In	a	community	organized	around	rules,	whether	it	is	a	community	of	states,	private	actors	or	cities,	compliance	is	secured,	at	least	in	part,	by	the	perception	of	a	rule	as	legitimate	by	those	to	whom	it	is	addressed.	Whether	the	rule	is	found	in	customary	international	law	or	is	promulgated	by	a	voluntary	certification	scheme	does	not	really	make	a	difference	–	the	question	of	whether	those	to	whom	the	rule	is	addressed	will	comply	turns	on	whether	they	deem	it	legitimate.	Legitimacy,	in	turn,	is	partly	determined	by	the	textual	determinacy	of	the	rule	in	question.			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapters,	the	GHG	Protocol	for	Cities	and	the	Compact	for	Mayors	both	provide	users	with	detailed	user	guidelines	that	are	intended	to	confer	a	high	degree	of	specificity	on	the	accounting	standards	and	criteria	that	global	cities	are	required	to	apply.	The	Compact	of	Mayors	also	publishes	user	guides	that	are	designed	to	help	cities	gain	a	firm	grasp	of	the	scope	of	their	reporting	obligations,	thereby	making	the	normative	content	of	the	voluntary	standard	clearly	ascertainable	to	cities	that	seek	certification.32	The	GHG	Protocol	for	Cities	is	contained	in	a	document	of	over	one	hundred	and	seventy	pages,	containing	detailed	information	about	goal	setting,	determining	the	boundaries	or	parameters	of	the	city’s	GHG	inventory,	the	accounting	methodologies	for	various	sectors	(such	as	waste	and	transportation),	and	methods	of	verification	to	assess	the	completeness	and	accuracy	of	reported	data.33	GHG	emission	standards	enjoy	a	high	degree	of	determinacy	because	they	lend	themselves	to	objective	measurement.	As	such,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	voluntary	standards	and	practices	that	global	cities	have	developed	and	implemented	contribute	positively	towards	determinacy	in	the	transnational	regime	complex	for	climate	change	because	of	their	high	level	of	textual	specificity	and	clarity	in	normative	content.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	as	far	as	voluntary	standards	are	concerned,	epistemic	quality	and	scientific	knowledge	may	be	more	important	considerations.	Naiki	argues,	“even…[voluntary]	standards	that	appear	to	be	determinate	may	not	be	considered	legitimate	and	credible	if	they	are	not	based	on	epistemic	quality	and	scientific	knowledge.”34	It	is	to	the	dimension	of	epistemic	quality	that	the	discussion	turns	to	next.																																																										31	Naiki	makes	this	point	in	assessing	the	sustainable	bioenergy	regime	complex;	Yoshiko	Naiki,	‘Trade	and	Bioenergy:	Explaining	and	Assessing	the	Regime	Complex	for	Sustainable	Bioenergy’	(2016)	27	European	Journal	of	International	Law	129,	pg.	151.	32	Compact	of	Mayors,	“Resources”,	online:	http://www.compactofmayors.org/resources/tools-for-cities/	(accessed	on	1	August	2016).		33	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol,	Global	Protocol	for	Community-Scale	Greenhouse	Gas	Emission	Inventories:	
An	Accounting	and	Reporting	Standard	for	Cities	(World	Resources	Institute,	C40,	and	ICLEI,	2014).		34	Naiki,	pg.	152.	
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quarters	of	global	GHG	emissions.49	In	addition,	cities	have	sought	to	ensure	that	their	requirements	and	guidance	for	calculating	and	reporting	city-wide	GHG	emissions	are	consistent	with	the	IPCC	guidelines.50	Therefore,	it	can	be	argued	that,	to	the	extent	that	epistemic	quality	refers	to	the	consistency	between	urban	climate	law	and	IPCC	science,	urban	climate	law	scores	well	for	this	criterion.	However,	it	should	also	be	noted	that	urban	climate	law	does	not	only	value	scientific	knowledge	as	a	source	of	epistemic	quality.	As	illustrated	in	Chapters	4	and	5,	a	key	characteristic	of	how	cities	and	their	networks	function	is	the	formation	of	extensive	partnerships	with	other	actors	to	tap	on	their	expertise	and	resources.	In	developing	standards	and	practices,	cities	have	valued	local	knowledge	and	global	knowledge.	Cities	have	also	sought	to	tap	on	the	expertise	of	urban	planners,	architects,	financiers,	entrepreneurs,	environmental	activists,	engineers	and	development	consultants	in	developing	climate	solutions.51			 	 	 	 		
2.4	Accountability		


















2.6	Fairness			 Finally,	Keohane	and	Victor	include	fairness	as	one	of	the	evaluative	criteria	but	do	not	say	much	about	it	except	that	multilateral	institutions	should	not	be	evaluated	on	the	basis	of	whether	they	achieve	the	“utopian	objective”	of	“reflect[ing]	abstract	normative	standards	of	fairness.”78	Instead,	fairness	simply	refers	to	the	notion	that	benefits	ought	to	be	distributed	widely	and	states	that	are	willing	to	cooperate	ought	not	to	be	discriminated	against.79		The	imposition	of	binding	GHG	emission	targets	on	developed	countries,	and	not	on	developing	countries,	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol	was	used	to	illustrate	the	fairness	point.	In	Keohane	and	Victor’s	view,	“the	absence	of	binding	rules	for	some	states	was	of	questionable	fairness.”80			 Fairness	can	be	said	to	comprise	of	two	key	aspects:	distributive	justice	and	procedural	fairness.	When	considering	whether	fairness	is	achieved	in	a	particular	context,	the	question	of	distributive	justice	would	be	whether	regime	complexes	“create	solutions	and	systems	which	take	into	account	society’s	answers	to	[the]	moral	issues	of	distributive	justice.”81	Procedural	fairness,	on	the	other	hand,	is	concerned	with	“what	the	participants	perceive	as	right	process.”82	I	adopt	Naiki’s	argument	that	the	criterion	of	procedural	fairness		“is	difficult	to	apply	in	the	context	of	regime	complexes,	because	the	question	is	whether	a	regime	complex	is	made	under	the	right	process.	Yet,	regime	complexes	often	emerge	without	the	right	process	or	order,	and	that	is	why	a	comprehensive	regime	was	not	yielded.”83	She	suggests	that	a	possible	line	of	inquiry	is	whether	each	regime	(within	the	regime	complex)	is	fair	in	the	procedural	sense,	for	instance, whether a voluntary 
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